Defending Iowa's First-in-the-Nation Status
The 1984 Precinct Caucuses HUGH WINEBRENNER FROM A POSITION of relative obscurity before 1972, the Iowa precinct caucuses evolved to their present position of national prominence in the presidential nominating process.' In recent elections, the time and attention given the Iowa caucuses by presidential candidates and the national media have increased geometrically. The impact of the caucuses has grown to the point that Iowa now rivals New Hampshire for the title of presidential kingmaker.T he transformation of the caucuses into a national event is an asset for the state. Iowa benefits from the national publicity surrounding the caucuses and the numerous in-depth stories about the state and its people. The caucuses also generate large sums of money for the state's economy as presidential candidates spend in pursuit of delegates, and the media also expend large sums to cover the campaigns. The national attention helps the Iowa Democratic and Republican parties by stimulating interest and participation in the caucus process. State officials of both parties are pleased to identify sources of citizen support several months before the November elections. They also are pleased by the increased status accorded the parties and their 1. For a discussion of the changes in the Iowa precinct caucuses, see Hugh Winebrenner, "The Evolution of the Iowa Precinct Caucuses," The Annals of Iowa 46 (Spring 1983): 618-35.
2. See Michael J. Robinson, Nancy Conover, and Margaret Sheehan, "The Media at Mid-Year," in Presidential Politics: Readings on Nominations and Elections, ed. James I. Lengle and Byron E. Shafer, 2nd ed. (New York, 1983) , 147-48. Also see Hugh Winebrenner, "The Iowa Precinct Caucuses: The Making of a Media Event," Southeastern Political Review (Fall 1985) . leaders, many of whom have been quoted in national publications such as Time and Newsweek.
But not everyone is pleased with the early precinct caucuses and their impact on the presidential selection process. Several states, undoubtedly envious of the status afforded Iowa, and probably not wanting a small farm state which normally supports Republican presidential candidates to play a pivotal role in choosing the Democratic nominee, have pressed for changes in the party rules governing the Democratic nominating process.Â lthough party rules which compressed the Democratic nominating process into a thirteen-week period between the second Tuesday in March and the second Tuesday in June were enacted for 1980, Iowa's (and New Hampshire's) position of prominence was preserved by the inclusion of an appeals process for states that held nominating events earlier in 1976. Iowa Democrats requested and received a variance to hold their 1980 precinct caucuses in January, thus successfully parrying attempts to limit their influence in the presidential selection process.
Efforts to limit the impact of Iowa and New Hampshire in the nominating process were renewed after the 1980 caucuses and primary elections.* The Democratic National Committee (DNC) appointed the Commission on Presidential Nominations (Hunt Commission) to consider a number of changes in the nominating process. Their January 15, 1982, report included a recommendation (proposed rule 10) that the length of the Democratic primary schedule be compressed into a thirteen-week period between the second Tuesday in March and the second Tuesday in June. In deference to Iowa and New Hampshire, they granted permanent exemptions from the schedule for the Iowa and New Hampshire nominating events although both had to be held later in 1984. (Iowa may hold its Democratic caucuses no earlier than fifteen days before the start of the thirteen-week period and New Hampshire seven days.) The exception gives Iowa and New Hampshire the opportunity to focus national attention on their primary events as in the past, but may lessen the longterm impact, as candidates can tumble more quickly from victor- Following the DNC decision, a dispute developed between New Hampshire and Vermont over the date of Vermont's "Town Meeting Day" which includes a presidential straw poll and traditionally is held on the first Tuesday in March. In 1984, that fell on March 6 which was the scheduled date for the New Hampshire presidential primary election. The DNC-approved thirteen-week "window" did not apply to non-binding electoral events such as Vermont's. The potential for conflict between the two states apparently had been underestimated by the Hunt Commission; although well aware of the date of the Vermont straw poll, the commission did not believe it necessary to schedule the New Hampshire primary election earlier than March 6.^ New Hampshire and the DNC were unsuccessful in resolving the conflict and New Hampshire Democrats, not wishing to share the limelight with Vermont on March 6, defied national party rules and moved its primary election forward a week to February 28.
Predictably, Iowa Democrats were extremely upset by the decision which would have narrowed the separation between the New Hampshire primary election and the Iowa caucuses to a single day.* Fearful that Iowa's impact in the Democratic party nominating process would be greatly diminished, Iowa Democrats discussed changing the date of their 1984 caucuses at a November 19, 1983 , meeting of the state central committee.^ John Law, former executive director of the Iowa Democratic party and a member of the Hunt Commission, informed the committee that a commission compromise had led to the new party rules governing the length of the primary and caucus schedule, and it was his understanding that Iowa had been guaranteed an eightday separation between the New Hampshire and Iowa primary 5. See Edward Campbell et al. v. Iowa State Democratic Central Committee and David Nagle, No. 83-115-W, 6 (S.D. Ia. January 17,1984) .
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events. He further argued that if New Hampshire violated party rules by moving its primary election forward and the DNC did not force them back into compliance, Iowa should advance its caucus date to maintain the eight-day separation. Members of the DNC Compliance Committee in attendance argued against a change in caucus dates and threatened disciplinary action against the Iowa Democratic party if national party rules were violated. The debate was spirited and sometimes animated before Bill Sueppel of Iowa City proposed a compromise that ultimately carried by a vote of twenty to ten: the Iowa caucuses would be held on February 20,1984, unless New Hampshire decided on or before December 10,1983, to return its primary election to the original March 6 date. If New Hampshire relented, the Iowa caucuses would be held on February 27 as originally scheduled. The deadline passed without action by New Hampshire and Iowa Democrats proceeded with plans for a February 20 caucus date in 1984.
The controversy over the decision to change the caucus date did not end on December 10, however. In Iowa, three prominent Democrats-Edward Campbell, former state party chair and cochair of the Móndale for President effort in Iowa; Jean Haugland, also a Móndale co-chair; and Charles Gifford, a member of the State Central Committee-filed suit in federal district court to block the change from February 27 to February 20.T he plaintiffs requested "that the Court enjoin the State Party from holding statewide caucuses on a date prior to the 27th day of February, 1984, as an earlier date would jeopardize the seating of Iowa delegates at the Democratic National Convention."^ In testimony, Gifford further asserted "that the State Party is obligated to follow the clear dictates of the National Party Rules and that failure to do so may well jeopardize Iowa's first-in-the-nation status in future election years."^° In defending the decision to move the caucus date forward, the state party, with presidential candidates Alan Cranston and John Glenn as intervenors, argued that the campaigns of some presidential candidates would suffer irreparable harm due to their large ex- The court ruled in favor of the defendants and let the earlier date stand. In the decision, the court agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief, but found for the defendants because "the intervenor presidential candidates will suffer a significant harm if the caucuses are not held on February 20, as their previous commitments may be wasted or reduced in effectiveness." The court added that "the individual damages that may be suffered by the plaintiffs are outweighed by the irreparable harm that changing the rules of the presidential nominating process [in Iowa] at this late date may have."'T he DNC entered the controversy by threatening sanctions if Iowa moved its caucus date forward, including the possibility of not seating the Iowa delegation selected by the "illegal" caucus process at the Democratic national convention. Ultimately, the DNC relented and on May 3,1984, agreed to seat both the Iowa and New Hampshire delegations at San Francisco, but scars remain from the intraparty struggle.
BY 1984, the Iowa precinct caucuses were institutionalized as a significant part of the primary and caucus schedule. The 1980 efforts of Carter, Kennedy, and Bush demonstrated that a strong organization was necessary to compete in Iowa and that the "dark horse" candidacies of McGovern in 1972 and Carter in 1976 probably would not recur now that Iowa was a wellpublicized event in the presidential nominating process. To fare well in Iowa would require a major organizational effort, but with New Hampshire a week later and "Super Tuesday" with its ten state delegate selection events on March 13, candidate efforts could not be concentrated in the state as they were when several weeks separated Iowa and New Hampshire.
Democratic presidential candidates were commonplace in Iowa from 1982 to 1984 as each worked to enlist supporters and develop an organization capable of identifying and turning out potential caucus supporters. Although most of the Democratic hopefuls made a strong effort and spent large sums of money 11. Ibid., 13. 12. Ibid. and energy pursuing support, it was no contest from the start. Móndale was well known in Iowa and he received early support from the United Auto Workers and the Iowa State Education Association. The support of organized groups and endorsements from many prominent Iowa Democrats helped Móndale develop an organization that was "clearly superior to others."" He developed an early lead in the polls, never relinquished the front-runner status, and entered the final stages of the Iowa campaign with a commanding lead. Other Democrats also made significant organizational efforts in the state, but with Móndale enjoying a seemingly insurmountable lead, they competed for second place and hoped for a stronger-than-predicted finish.
Alan Cranston was probably the next best organized of the Democratic candidates and the fifty-five days and $727,358 that he spent in Iowa in the two years prior to the 1984 caucuses topped all presidential hopefuls. He made nuclear disarmament the central issue in his campaign and was well known in Iowa by the time of the caucuses.^Ĝ ary Hart was the first candidate to open an Iowa campaign office but it took him a long time to develop an effective organization. Limited funds, the decision to move a number of his campaign staff to Wisconsin where he unsuccessfully competed in that state's straw poll, and the resignation of top aides made continuity difficult; but he appeared well organized in the final weeks of the Iowa campaign.
John Glenn apparently never understood the nature of a caucus organization as he ran a primary election race in Iowa. The $759,178 spent by his campaign included heavy expenditures on television which may work well in a primary election but generally produce few results in the Iowa caucuses. (John Connally unsuccessfully employed the same approach in the 1980 caucuses.) 13 In the final weeks leading to the caucuses reporters searched for the ''typical Iowan" to interview, and most of all, played the "expectations game."i^ Móndale was judged the "clear front-runner" and John Glenn the "primary challenger" even though a significant Glenn campaign organization never developed in Iowa. McGovern, Hart, and Cranston were branded "dark horses"; HoUings, Askew, and the late entrant, Jesse Jackson, were dismissed as "also rans."^'
As the caucuses neared, media coverage was awesome. The press "filing space" for the 1984 caucus night was double that of 1980. Over one thousand press credentials were issued by the Iowa Democratic party to representatives of approximately 150 United States and foreign news organizations: over thirty television and many radio stations were represented in Iowa; Meet the Press and Face the Nation originated from Des Moines on the day before the caucuses; on February 20, the day of the caucuses, the After months under the media microscope and to the relief of many Iowans, the 8 p.m. starting time for the February 20 precinct caucuses finally arrived. It took twelve minutes for controversy to erupt. On the basis of a review of "sign-in sheets" at some caucuses, CBS projected Walter Móndale the Iowa winner at 8:12 p.m. (CST), eighteen minutes before Democratic party rules permitted the delegate selection process to begin.^^ NBC used polls and News Election Service (a vote counting service funded by ABC, CBS, NBC, AP, and UPI) data to project at 8:18 p.m. that Móndale "will be the winner," John Glenn "will not finish second," and "there is a very good chance tonight that Cary Hart will be second."" ABC withheld its projection that Móndale would win and that Glenn, Hart, and Cranston were "fighting it out for second place" until 8:46 p.m., sixteen minutes after the caucuses began but before any delegate counts were available.^"^ (Delegates elected to county conventions provide the official basis for determining winners and losers in the Iowa caucuses.) Iowa Democrats were very disturbed by the early media projections and so was the United States Congress. On February 27, 1984, the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance held a hearing on early elec- tion projections which centered on the Iowa caucuses. Chairman Tim Wirth (D., Colorado) informed those present that the hearing was being held "to discuss the civic responsibility of the electronic media and the implications that their methods and their announcements of projected results have on the electoral process."^^ A number of research papers were received and testimony was taken from top media executives and leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties. Dave Nagle, Iowa Democratic chair, testified that the state party had evidence that the early projections found their way into caucuses that were in progress. Nagle warned that "to report the supposed outcome of our process before it even begins .. . runs the risk of seriously intruding on the process and damaging the party."^T he subcommittee continued hearings on the problems of early 1984 election projections, and late in the year, two congressmen, Al Swift (D., Washington) and Bill Thomas (R., California), formally asked ABC, CBS, and NBC for "a firm, explicit, public, corporate commitment not to use exit poll data to suggest, through interpretation of that data, the probable winner in any state until the polls in that state have closed."^^ By early 1985, the three networks had forwarded letters to Congressmen Swift and Thomas which stated that in future elections they would not "use exit polling data to project or characterize election results until the polls are closed in [that] state.'^^ In return, the congressmen agreed to begin hearings on a uniform election day throughout the United States. It is not clear how the agreement will affect reporting of Iow^a caucus outcomes. If taken literally, the 1984 projections of caucus results based on entrance polls and party "sign-in sheets" will not recur in 1988.
The early projections were not the only controversy associated with results. Apparently sensitive to the criticism that Iowa caucus results are not meaningful, the electronic and print media requested the Iowa Democratic party to provide a breakdown of the candidate preferences of those attending the 1984 caucuses. In essence, they were asking the party to conduct a straw poll of caucus members and provide raw vote totals rather than the delegate equivalent totals reported since 1972. Iowa Democrats asserted that raw vote totals would misrepresent the caucus process and refused to bow to media demands.^* The media responded by employing the News Election Service to attempt to determine candidate preference totals at the caucuses. Since the caucus process does not lend itself to tabulating candidate preferences, and the Iowa Democratic party refused to cooperate, the news election service was able to provide preference totals for only 74 percent of the 2,495 precincts; those totals are of questionable validity due to the dynamic nature of the caucus process. The presence of two sets of results proved to be confusing to all.
As caucus results began to come in on February 20, the "expectations game" continued with media interpretation of the outcomes. Some of the media reported News Election Service results; some Democratic party delegate equivalents, and others reported both.^o The Newsweek summary of the Iowa caucuses was representative. They concluded that "Mondale's victory met all expectations," and Glenn's "humiliating fifth-place finish" was a disaster for his campaign. McGovern's third-place finish was "startling" and "the caucuses gave Hart 'media momentum.'" Cranston, Askew, and Hollings were declared the big losers along with Glenn. On the basis of Iowa, Newsweek reduced the field to Móndale, Hart, Jackson, "and maybe Glenn." Perhaps the biggest winner in the Iowa expectations game was Hart since he was elevated to the position of Mondale's primary competitor, a position previously assigned to Glenn.^^ On the February 23 NBC Nightly News, Don Oliver reported that after Iowa, contributions to the Hart campaign increased from $2,000 to $12,000 per day.
THE REPUBLICANS also held precinct caucuses in 1984, but with an incumbent president seeking reelection there was no media interest in their meetings until President Reagan decided to visit Iowa on February 20, the day of the caucuses. The president appeared in Waterloo and Des Moines in an attempt to increase interest in the Republican caucuses and perhaps to steal some of the limelight from the Democrats who had monopolized media attention in Iowa for several weeks.
The straw poll initiated in 1976 and continued in 1980 was not conducted in the 1984 Republican caucuses. The rationale offered by Republican officials for the absence of a poll was the lack of a contest for the nomination. This was probably a wise move on the part of Republican leaders as it assured no media publicity for any dissatisfied Republicans that might have attended caucuses. Attendance figures for the Republican caucuses are very tentative due to the absence of a poll, but it was estimated that twenty-three to thirty thousand people participated.^Â lthough they have cooperated with their Democratic counterparts, Iowa's Republican party has played a more limited role in defending the state's position of prominence. The national Republican party has no rules governing the length of their primary and caucus season, and when Iowa raised the issue at the 1984 national convention, there was little interest in developing such rules. 
